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Mass participation in democratic politics emerged at the end of the 
Nineteenth Century. This was predicated on the widespread acceptance 
that representative politics, democratic electoral processes, and mass 
membership parties and trade unions, were central to advancing people’s 
social interests (Mair 2013: 77). This social contract has come under 
increasing fragmentation in recent decades and is a developing area of 
research internationally (Stoker et al. 2018; Glaser 2018; Wood 2015; Hay 
2007).  
In many long-term democratic countries, this destabilisation has been 
linked to a process of anti-politics and the rise of anti-politicians (Stoker 
2006: 40). ‘Anti-politics’ can be broadly understood as the growing mood 
of public disaffection towards contemporary politics and politicians, and 
often the mobilisation of that mood by new (or newly re-made) politicians 
and political projects (Humphrys 2018a). Some highlight the connection 
between growing anti-political sentiment, or related processes of 
depoliticisation and populism, and the relinquishment of responsibility for 
economic planning and governing by politicians and state managers as 
neoliberalism has advanced (Burnham 2014). However, others situate this 
political rupture in longer-run developments pre-dating this era, even if 
they accelerated after the 1970s (Clarke et al. 2017). 
Australia has not experienced a Brexit, Trump, gilets jaunes or Five Star 
Movement anti-political ‘moment’; yet there is a tendency by the media 
and political pundits to compare or read the situation off that in other 
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locations. For example, a 2017 BBC article argued that Pauline Hanson 
was a contender ‘for the title of Antipodean Trump’ (Marks 2017), and a 
recent opinion piece in the Australian Financial Review argued Australia’s 
immigration policy is a Brexit waiting to happen (Roggeveen 2019). 
Rather than presume comparability regarding a potential source for anti-
politics in electoral fragmentation, this article examines evidence for this. 
We use the approach employed by Peter Mair when examining the long-
term democratic countries of the European Union, in his posthumously 
published Ruling the Void (2013), and consider data related to electoral 
participation, party loyalty, electoral volatility and party membership. 
Mair (2013: 20) argues that although there is increasing debate about 
citizen disengagement, ‘both in the scholarly literature and in the popular 
media, the evidence of this withdrawal is sometimes disputed’. We 
acknowledge that some of the terrain we cover has already been 
considered by others (see in particular, McAllister 2011; Denemark et al. 
2007; Donovan et al. 2007). However, we agree with Mair that it is 
important to conduct an assessment that draws together the various 
features of popular withdrawal from politics. In doing this, we offer a more 
comprehensive overview than presently exists in the scholarly literature, 
and assess the timing of neoliberalism in relation to shifts in citizen 
disengagement. In doing so, we demonstrate how political decomposition 
and potential deepening of anti-politics represents a significant political 
economic challenge in Australia, as it directly impacts the capacity of the 
political class to execute new projects. This dwindling faculty of political 
society poses particular challenges when seeking to address global 
existential threats to humanity, such as climate change or future pandemics 
akin to COVID-19.  
In the first section of this article, we consider approaches to understanding 
the phenomenon of anti-politics. In section two, we detail our 
methodology by drawing on Mair’s approach, as well as issues relevant to 
data availability and quality. In section three, we examine the relevant 
Australian electoral and party data, and detail our findings. In the 
conclusion we argue that there is evidence indicating political 
disengagement and fragmentation is taking place in Australia, potentially 
underpinning processes of anti-politics. The evidence we present points in 
the same direction, but Australian electoral institutions (compared to those 
analysed by Mair) create measurement error, which obscures the 
distinctiveness of the signal trends. We find that on most indicators, the 
phenomenon pre-dates the neoliberal era in Australia.  
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The rise of anti-politics 
Anti-political sentiment and large scale anti-political moments are of 
increasing interest for scholars. Such moments include Brexit and the 
election of Donald Trump, which were both the result, at least in part, of 
large-scale mistrust in established political figures (Hobolt 2016; Inglehart 
and Norris 2016). Vittorio Mete (2010: 39-40) articulates anti-politics as: 
made up of the sum of the critical discussions, attitudes and actions 
directed against political actors and institutions by different individuals 
who in a variety of roles form part of the political community (political 
leaders, ordinary people, political militants, journalists, businessmen, 
exponents of civil society etc.). Anti-political criticism particularly 
focuses on political parties and professional politicians, who are 
accused of being corrupt, inefficient, parasitic, incapable, arrogant, 
open to bribery and remote from people’s needs. 
Thus, anti-politics consists of a broad, and growing, disenchantment 
amongst the general voting public in liberal democracies and, in particular, 
the political class (Schedler 1996; 1997; Hay 2007; Clarke et al. 2016). As 
Copland (2019: 4) argues, anti-politics encapsulates the sentiment ‘that 
mainstream political systems are not functioning, and are designed to 
benefit those who are already in the elite at the expense of “everyday 
people”’. These sentiments, identified by Mete and Copland, have 
contributed to the decline of mass participation in democratic politics. This 
has resulted in decreasing voter participation, a drop in partisan loyalty, 
growing electoral volatility, and a decline in membership and engagement 
both with political parties and other civil society actors such as unions. 
While deeply linked, the notion of anti-politics differs from similar 
concepts, in particular ‘populism’ (Copland 2019). While studies of 
populism do incorporate both elements, the literature primarily examines 
the phenomenon utilsing a top-down approach (Barr 2009), while anti-
politics is more bottom-up (Schedler 1997). Studies of populism primarily 
examine high-profile maverick leaders who use anti-establishment and 
anti-elitist messages to gain support. The anti-politics literature, however, 
examines these feelings amongst the broader populace, studying how 
populations react against the political class and how political leaders 
mobilise around this sentiment. Anti-politics, therefore, ‘can be seen as 
one of the main features characterising populism’, with anti-politics 
frequently being ‘one of the rhetorical tools used by populist leaders in 
their public speeches’ (Mete 2010: 42-3). In a similar vein, Humphrys and 
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Tietze (2013) emphasise that anti-politics can be both ‘a widespread mood’ 
among ordinary people, as well as a ‘political strategy’ mobilising that 
mood and used by sections (or aspiring sections) of the political class.  
With these frameworks in mind, it is useful to understand Mair’s analysis 
in Ruling the Void (2013) as being a version of either anti-politics from 
below (Mete 2010), or as a reflection of the ‘widespread mood’ among 
ordinary people (Humphrys and Tietze 2013). Anti-politics, as opposed to 
populism and other similar concepts, presents a valuable tool to study 
sentiments held by the broader populace opposing the political class. In 
doing this, Mair examines a number of indicators through which he thinks 
it is likely the general population is expressing this general sentiment (or 
‘widespread mood’): reduced voter turnout, increased electoral volatility, 
reduced party loyalties, increased votes for minor parties, falls in party 
membership and that of civil society organisations (i.e. unions).  
Methodology 
Mair argues the age of party democracy is over. His research details an 
unmistakable trend in popular disengagement from politics, connected to 
a ‘generalised anti-political mood across advanced capitalist countries’ 
(Mair 2013: 3). He argues that although his research and findings focus on 
the European Union, the lessons and trends are more broadly applicable 
across advanced capitalist countries (Mair 2013: 8). Utilising a 
methodology similar to that used to analyse climate change, he argues that 
in assessing various indicators over time, the small shifts take on a 
different meaning when considered alongside longer-term trends and 
multiple criteria. Thus, although the pattern might not be wholly 
unidirectional, the overall direction and reach of the phenomenon is key 
(Mair 2013: 26-7). 
Our research has examined Australian electoral data across the same 
indicators as Mair, and in the following we explore evidence for anti-
politics as follows: electoral participation (turnout and informal voting); 
party loyalty (partisanship); electoral volatility (major party first 
preference votes and consistency of vote); and, party membership 
(including a consideration of trade union membership). In relation to 
electoral volatility, we have focussed on the House of Representatives, and 
have not considered Senate voting patterns. Since government is formed 
in the lower house, these electoral contests are the location where voters 
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make their retrospective assessments of government performance (Fiorina 
1978).  
Aspects of Australian democratic institutions present difficulties to test 
Mair’s thesis, and below we outline some of these characteristics. In the 
later section on voter turnout, we also discuss the implications of 
compulsory voting and challenge of measuring the decline in electoral 
participation. 
Data availability and data quality 
In order to consider the timing of changes to the implementation of 
neoliberalism, we have sought (where possible) to examine data that 
commences well prior to the start of the neoliberal era. The 
Commonwealth body that oversees elections commenced collating and 
releasing electoral data to the public from 1949. We have, therefore, 
commenced our analysis of this data from that point. In regard to opinion 
data, social attitudes surveys rarely provide insight into social attitudes in 
the pre-neoliberal era, due to when they were conducted. There are also 
significant issues of data availability and quality regarding membership of 
Australian political parties, although this is not unusual internationally 
(Van Haute et al. 2018: 369). We have relied on two data sets to analyse 
party membership. Primarily we have used the international Members and 
Activists of Political Parties (MAAP) dataset (Van Haute et al. 2015). For 
the Australian Greens, we have used data collated by Stewart Jackson for 
the period 1989-2012 (Jackson 2011), combined with that provided to us 
directly by the national office of the Australian Greens for the period 2012-
2019. We believe this combined data gives the most complete figures 
available for the Greens and is more extensive than those in the MAAP 
dataset.   
Defining the major parties 
We include the following parties within the category ‘major parties’: the 
Australian Labor Party; the Liberal Party of Australia; the National Party 
of Australia, and the predecessor parties to them in-line with the literature 
(Jackman 2003). We carefully considered whether to include the 
Australian Greens as a major party, given its reputation as Australia's ‘third 
major party’ in parts of the media narrative (Quinn 2010). This is a 
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decision that has a significant impact on evaluating the total major party 
vote over time. An increasing number of Greens voters who had also voted 
for the Greens at a previous election, alongside an increasing vote overall, 
could be viewed as an indication of growing stability and the transition of 
the Australian electoral system from a two-party to a three-party system. 
Between 1996 and 2016 the number of Greens voters who had voted for 
them at a previous election increased by 20 percent (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1: Proportion of Australian Greens voters (%) who voted for 
the party at the previous election 
 
Source: Australian Electoral Commission; authors’ calculations using the 
Australian Election Study (1996-2019). 
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We are of the opinion, however, that the formation of the Greens speaks 
directly to the longer run fragmenting of traditional political structures in 
Australia. The time period covering the Greens’ presence is also 
historically short, and we are disinclined to draw conclusions about a more 
fundamental reorganisation of the major parties at this time. On this basis, 
we have not included the Greens in what we term the ‘major parties’ for 
the purposes of our analysis.  
In moving to discuss our results, we first examine existent data and 
discussion of anti-politics in Australia. We then proceed, as Mair did, in 
considering electoral participation, party loyalty, electoral volatility and 
party membership in turn. 
Anti-politics in Australia? 
There has been a growing interest in trust in the Australian political system 
in recent years. Stoker et al. (2018) conducted a systematic review of 
research on trust in Australian political systems, with data going back to 
the 1990s. In 2018, they found that fewer than 41 percent of Australian 
citizens were currently satisfied with the way democracy works, down a 
staggering 45 points from 86 percent in 2007. They conclude that there is 
compelling evidence of ‘an increasing trust divide between government 
and citizen […] and lack of public confidence in the capacity of 
government to address public policy concerns’ (Stoker et al. 2018: 9).  
While the specific numbers vary, this collapse in trust in Australian 
political institutions is also commonly found in data from Australian 
polling agencies (e.g. Markus 2014; McAllister and Cameron 2019). Each 
year, the polling company Edelman conducts international polls examining 
levels of trust across the globe. In 2019, the survey found that in Australia 
only 42 percent of the ‘general population’ trusted government, although 
this had increased by seven percent since 2018 (Edelman 2019). Some 
pollsters have found that this distrust goes beyond concern about the 
specifics of Australian institutions and toward democracy itself. Research 
prior to the 2016 Australian Federal Election found that only 42 percent of 
Australians were happy with the way democracy worked (Evans et al. 
2016). Moreover, this figure may continue to fall as the percentage of those 
who have little faith in democracy was much higher amongst those aged 
between 18 and 29 (Oliver 2014).  
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The Australian Election Study also provides a detailed analysis of electoral 
engagement (McAllister and Cameron 2019). While the latest survey 
found small upticks in engagement in the 2019 election compared to 2016 
– for example, watching pre-election debates or trying to persuade others 
how to vote – there remains an overall trend of decreased engagement in 
Australian elections from the general public. The Study also shows 
increasing electoral volatility in Australia, including that people made their 
decision on who to vote for later in the campaign and a significant fall in 
those who consider themselves ‘lifetime voters’ for one of the two major 
parties. 
Alongside this, some scholars have identified moments of anti-politics in 
Australia, particularly analysing anti-politics as a political strategy used 
by members of the political elite to gain support. Much of this literature 
focuses on populism which, as Mete (2010) points out, is best viewed as 
an expression of top-down anti-political sentiment. Moffit (2017), for 
example, argues that there is a specific version of ‘Antipodean’ populism 
that has developed in Australia and New Zealand. This populism – 
informed by both countries’ status as settler colonial states and 
geographically isolated islands – focusses on excluding ‘others’ along 
material, political and symbolic dimensions; has a producerist notion of 
‘the people’; and sets up the ‘elite’, ‘immigrant others’ and ‘Indigenous 
people’ as triple enemies. Moffit argues that this Antipodean populism has 
been expressed in Australia through a series of right-wing individuals 
including Clive Palmer, Jackie Lambie and Bob Katter – but, most 
particularly, Pauline Hanson (see also Stoker 2006: 134). This populism, 
however, struggles somewhat due to Australia’s strongly institutionalised 
electoral system and design of the country’s almost universal bicameral 
parliaments (save Queensland and the two territories). Populism is also 
limited because many populist ideas have been adopted by mainstream 
parties. This mainstreaming of populism was particularly evident in the 
Howard era from 1996 to 2007 (Sawer and Laycock 2009; Wear 2008; 
Curran 2004), with the Liberal Prime Minister using rhetoric against 
‘special interests’ and ‘liberal elites’ as a core part of his ongoing appeal 
(Pearse 2017). 
Other authors have studied particular moments of the expression of anti-
political sentiment in the Australian context. Of particular concern has 
been Australia’s ‘revolving door of Prime Ministers’, which some argue is 
partly the outcome of a crisis in domestic politics due to a deep decline in 
trust in the system (Evans et al. 2019). Tietze (2015), in particular, argues 
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that there has been a hollowing out of the social bases of Australia’s major 
political parties in recent decades, resulting in rolling crises in the political 
sphere – especially since the election of Kevin Rudd in 2007. Copland 
(2019) also examines the campaign against the carbon tax, introduced by 
the Julia Gillard-led ALP Government in 2011, as an example of this form 
of anti-political campaigning. He outlines how the main figurehead of this 
campaign, opposition leader, Tony Abbott, tapped into a range of anti-
political sentiments (such as distrust in the elite) to oppose the carbon 
pricing regime. 
Humphrys (2019: 227) argues that although the phenomenon of anti-
politics predates the rise of neoliberalism, it appears the era of economic 
reorientation may have accelerated it. However, the lines of causation and 
relationship require further research. In regards to this research project, we 
understand neoliberalism to be a state-centred political project, shaped by 
a macroeconomic approach to reorient national economies in the wake of 
the 1970s economic crises. Although there is significant national variation, 
‘more enduring’ policies include privatisation and outsourcing, flexible 
labour markets, deregulation of financial markets and exchange controls, 
and monetary policy to maintain low levels of inflation (Davidson 2013: 
190). In Australia, we consider the start of the neoliberal era to be the 
‘vanguard’ reorientation of economic policy along neoliberal lines, with 
the election of the Hawke ALP Government in 1983 (Humphrys 2019: 93-
101). 
Electoral participation 
Declining voter turnout at elections 
One of the noteworthy features of Australian electoral politics is 
compulsory voting. It was first introduced at Commonwealth elections in 
1924, and Australia remains the only majority English-speaking country 
to have adopted this policy. Compulsory voting was introduced to address 
the problem of low voter turnout in the wake of World War I, and Australia 
has maintained higher voter turnout than comparable democracies as a 
result (Franklin 1999). While compulsory voting is considered by many to 
involve the positive integration of citizens into the political process, it is 
simultaneously a mechanism that compels the integration of civil society 
(and elements that might be politically disenfranchised) into the functions 
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of the state. In that sense, it attempts to engender consent for the processes 
of representative democracy (Humphrys 2019: 40).  
Compulsory voting compels citizens by fining those on the electoral-roll 
who do not cast a vote in Commonwealth, state and local elections. While 
electors can still choose not to vote, the fine ensures a high participation 
rate compared to voluntary voting as there is, in effect, no lawful or 
inexpensive option to exit the process. Demand for voting for a party is no 
longer conditioned by the priced opportunity cost of voting; instead, it rests 
on the quality of choices on offer (Hirschman 1970: 23). The implication 
of this is that trends in electoral participation will not be as prominent or 
significant as in countries with voluntary voting. 
A key indicator of citizen disengagement is electoral turnout, especially 
when this is considered alongside other forms of mass political behaviour 
(Mair 2013: 21). Mair argued that declining turnout data across the 
European counties he examined must be understood as ‘something both 
unidirectional and pervasive, and that offers a striking indicator of the 
growing enfeeblement of the electoral process’ (Mair 2013: 26). While he 
notes that generational replacement may be a factor, where ‘non-
participating younger people replace participatory older generations in 
ever-changing electorates’ (Mair 2013: 23), it could equally be the result 
of ‘sheer boredom’ (Mair 2013: 26). 
In Australia, as detailed in Figure 2 below, voter turnout has been falling. 
Election turnout remained in the range of 94-96 percent from 1949 until 
the election of the ALP Rudd Government in 2007, but since then has 
experienced a noteworthy decline. As the trend line indicates, turnout 
trended down from 1950-1980, before trending up slightly with higher 
turnout in the 1990, 1993 and 1996 elections, and then entering a sharper 
decline. 
Various changes to the voting enrolment process in Australia have 
impacted the percentage of potential voters listed on the electoral roll. 
Turnout is reported as a percentage of those eligible to vote (i.e. enrolled) 
and, although it has always been compulsory to enrol, this has not been 
tracked or enforced through penalties (as it is with failing to vote). 
However, since 2010 a process of direct (‘automatic’) enrolment, using 
Commonwealth and state government data such as driver’s licences, 
taxation returns and granting of citizenship, has increased the number of 
potential voters who are enrolled. Alongside this, factors such as better 
resourcing of enrol-to-vote drives, have increased the percentage of 
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potential voters who are enrolled, and this may have impacted what we are 
observing in terms of turnout. However, even accounting for these factors, 
it is likely that there has still been a meaningful drop in turnout, while a 
higher percentage of potential voters enrolled does not exclude the lower 
turnout connected to political disengagement. Although there was a 
temporary rise in turnout from the mid 1980s to around the year 2000, the 
overall trend predates the neoliberal era (despite speeding-up during it).   
Figure 2: Turnout (% of all votes), House of Representatives, 1949-
2019 
 
Source: Sharman (2020); Australian Electoral Commission (2019).  
Note: 1949-2016 data was sourced from the University of Western Australia’s 
Australian Politics and Elections Archive 1856-2018, and 2019 data from electoral 
returns. 
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Increasing informal voting 
Any level of informal voting calls into question the legitimacy of a 
democracy’s electoral system (Kelly 2012: 54), and Australia has one of 
the highest rates of informal and spoiled voting amongst long-term 
democratic countries. This is commonly viewed as a consequence of 
compulsory voting (Birch 2009; AEC 2003a), and the complexity of the 
electoral system and ballot completion rules (Mackerras and McAllister 
1999: 224-6). In a system of compulsory voting, it is regarded as a 
‘functional equivalent of non-voting’ (Hill and Rutledge-Prior 2016: 401), 
and Shaun Major argues that ‘the informality rate increases under 
compulsory voting because voluntary abstention is no longer an option’ 
(cited in Medew 2003: 8). 
Informal votes fall into two categories: unintentional and intentional. In 
Australia, unintentional informal votes are ‘the result of either defective 
numbering or the use of ticks or crosses instead of numbers’, while 
intentional informal votes are ‘taken to be those that have either been 
scribbled on or left blank’ (Hill and Rutledge-Prior 2016: 401). Informal 
voting is also linked to the failure of the system to adequately facilitate the 
votes of all electors. Sally Young and Lisa Hill (2009: 79) argue that a 
‘significant number of voters are effectively excluded from the electoral 
process by the high threshold for valid voting’, and that these voters ‘tend 
to be drawn from amongst the already socially excluded whose education 
levels, low literacy/numeracy skills of low English-language proficiency’ 
limit the ability to participate. Jackman (2005) notes that ballot length and 
informality are related – a relation that becomes stronger with voters from 
non-English speaking households – and that informality decreases as 
tertiary education rises. 
Between 1901 and 1983, the informal vote was mostly between two and 
three percent – with the exception of several elections in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s, when it spiked to four and five percent on several occasions, 
and in the 1950s-1970s when it occasionally fell slightly below two 
percent (Australian Electoral Commission 2003b). As Figure 3 illustrates, 
the informal vote has been increasing since the mid-1970s – prior to the 
neoliberal era in Australia – and has not been below three percent since the 
1996 election. In elections since 1996, it has been above five percent in 
five of the eight federal elections. At the 2013, election the informal vote 
was 5.91 percent, in 2016 it was 5.05 percent, and at the 2019 election it 
was 5.54 percent. 
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Figure 3: Informal Vote (% total informal votes), House of 
Representatives, 1949-2019 
 
Source: Sharman (2020); Australian Electoral Commission (2019).  
Note: 1949-2016 data was sourced from the University of Western Australia’s 
Australian Politics and Elections Archive 1856-2018, and 2019 data from the 
electoral returns. 
 
Although it is ‘impossible to be certain of the true intent of informal voters’ 
(Hill and Rutledge-Prior 2016: 401), and as detailed in Figure 4, the 
proportion of votes assumed to be intentional informal votes has been 
increasing – although the relatively short time-frame involved means this 
phenomenon requires further observation. One hypothesis is that young 
voters are driving the rise in intentional informal voting. Hill and 
Rutledge-Prior (2016: 412) have assessed aggregate level Census data and 
the results of the Australian Electoral Study (AES) regarding young people 
and political disaffection – addressing themes such as interest in politics, 
trust in politicians, dissatisfaction with democracy and perceived lack of 
political choice amongst candidates – and conclude that there is ‘evidence 
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for the suspicion that younger voters are playing a key role in the large and 
apparently rising share of intentional informal votes at Australian national 
elections’. Moreover, based on the AES, it is reasonable to assume that ‘in 
the absence of alternative legal exit options like “None-of-the-Above” 
voting’, intentional informal voting may be rising as a result of protest and 
dissatisfaction (Hill and Rutledge-Prior 2016: 413). 
Figure 4: Assumed unintentional and intentional informal voting (% 
total cast votes), House of Representatives, 2001-2016 
 
Source: AEC (2017).  
Note: Figures for 2001-2010 use an older AEC definition, and 2013 and 2016 use 
a refined one. For comparison purposes, the figures in brackets for 2013 and 2016 
use the older definition.  
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Party loyalty 
Weakening identification with political parties 
To understand trends in party loyalty, we examined survey data regarding 
partisanship. Since 1966, three national surveys have asked Australians 
about their identification with Australia’s political parties, and we have 
combined data from these: Australian National Political Attitudes Surveys 
(1966, 1969, 1979); National Social Science Survey (NSSS) (1983-1988); 
and the Australian Election Study (1987-2019). These surveys each ask 
which parties, if any, a voter identifies with, as well as the strength of that 
identification. Partisanship measures can be identified in Figure 5. 
  
Figure 5: Partisanship identification as indicated by surveyed voters, 
1967-2019 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations; Australian National Political Attitudes Survey 
(1967-1979); Australian National Social Science Survey (1983-1988); Australian 
Election Study (1987-2019). 
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Partisanship is cyclical and follows who is in government at the time. 
Identification with the ALP, for example, is at its highest during the 
Hawke/Keating era, while, despite a steady decline, identification with the 
Coalition sees two small spikes during both the Fraser and Howard 
Governments. However, there is a clear steady decline in partisan 
identification for both major parties. After a high of above 45 percent in 
the late 1960s, identification with the Coalition declined to just above 35 
percent during the Hawke/Keating era in the 1980s. After a slight increase 
during the Howard Government, identification with the Coalition has since 
declined to 32 percent. Identification with the ALP started below that of 
the Coalition at 37 percent in the late 1960s. This rose to above 45 percent 
during the Hawke/Keating era, but has since declined steadily (despite a 
small rise during the Rudd/Gillard Governments) to 30 percent in 2019.   
At the same time as these declines, we can see increasing partisan 
attachment to the Greens, aligning with their rise as a third major force in 
Australian politics. In 2019, nine percent of respondents said they 
identified with the Greens, a new high for the party. Alignment with other 
parties varies. While these numbers stayed at approximately 1-2 percent in 
the 1960s-1980s, there is a sharp increase to above 10 percent by the early 
1990s. This likely aligns with the rise of the Democrats as a third force in 
Australian politics at that time. These numbers have then fluctuated, 
matching the fluctuating fortunes of other parties across this period (as 
discussed in the section on electoral volatility below). Finally, the 
percentage of respondents who answered that they do not identify with any 
party has steadily risen to 21 percent in 2019. 
We can also see changing trends in the strength of partisanship, as seen in 
Figure 6, with the number of people who do not identify with a party rising 
to 21 percent in 2019. Those who do identify with a party do not identify 
as strongly as in the past, and those who rate their partisanship as ‘very 
strong’ has halved from 30 percent in the late 1960s to only just above 15 
percent in 2019. 
While party loyalty fluctuates based on who is in government at any 
particular point of time, through this data we can see a clear and defined 
decrease in identification with Australia’s two major parties. In 2019, a 
record number of Australians indicated that they did not identify with any 
party at all. Those who do identify with any party also identify with those 
parties less strongly, with those who indicate that they have a very strong 
identification with their party halving in the past thirty years. 
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Figure 6: Strength of partisanship as indicated by surveyed voters, 
1967-2019 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations; Australian National Political Attitudes Survey 
(1967-1979); Australian National Social Science Survey (1983-1988); Australian 
Election Study (1987-2019).   
Electoral volatility 
Electoral volatility is an indication of voters’ willingness to change their 
voting behaviour across electoral cycles. The level of volatility, as Mair 
(2013: 29) explains, describes ‘the behaviour of those citizens who do 
participate, and measures the extent to which their voting patterns reveal 
consistency and stability over time in the distribution of partisan 
preferences.’ A particular indicator of volatility is that people are more 
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willing to vote for new parties and new candidates, with these parties and 
candidates receiving increased success. 
Weakening major parties vote 
Alongside our other measures, the nature of the Australian electoral system 
influences our ability to measure electoral volatility. Australian federal 
elections operate under a compulsory preferential model. Voters in 
Australia are required to number all candidates on a ballot paper in order 
of preference in most elections. If a voters’ first preference is not 
successful, their vote transfers to their second, third, fourth etcetera 
preferences. In practical terms, this means that in votes in the House of 
Representatives, the vast majority of contests, after preferences are 
distributed, are measured as contests between the two major parties. This 
is called ‘two party preferred’ and is measured by the Australian Electoral 
Commission at a national, state and individual electorate level. The total 
vote going to the major parties has been in steady decline in Australia since 
1980 (see Figure 7 below).  
Preferential voting makes it much harder for volatility in voting 
preferences to destabilise the two-party system. As voters are required to 
preference all candidates, a vote for a minor party candidate has a lesser 
impact than in a first-past-the-post system. While, for example, the ALP 
has worked to regain voters lost to the Greens, they have simultaneously 
largely been able to rely on those votes to return to them in preferential 
distributions. In the 2019 election, the flow of these preferences to the ALP 
was 79 percent (Scales 2019). Compared to first-past-the-post systems, 
therefore, preferential voting changes the calculus for voters. Preferential 
voting allows voters to vote for a minor party with less risk of destabilising 
the system overall. This is why for Labor partisans, the Greens are ‘a 
convenient method of protesting against Labor […] without making the 
much more substantial commitment of voting Liberal’ (McAllister 2011: 
108). However, this can work in two ways, making voters feel either more 
comfortable voting for a third party as there is less risk of it destabilising 
the system or, alternatively, discouraging this activity as it is seen pointless 
precisely because it does not have this destabilising effect. 
These trends are impacting both major parties. Figure 7 shows the first 
preference vote for the Coalition and ALP respectively. First preference 
votes for the Coalition decreased earlier than the ALP – dropping from just 
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under 50 percent in the late 1940s to just above 45 percent in the 1960s. 
After a slight plateau, Coalition votes have since decreased to 
approximately 41.4 percent by 2019. The Labor Party’s vote remained flat 
in the early stages of our dataset, up until the early 1980s. It has since seen 
a steeper drop-off, from just above 45 percent in the early 1980s to 33.34 
percent in the 2019 election.  
Figure 7: Major party vote (% total votes), House of Representatives, 
1949-2019 
 
 Source: Australian Electoral Commission. 
 
Part of these differences can be explained by the particularities of the 
destabilisation in the Australian context. Australia has seen the rise of a 
number of minor parties in the time period of our data collection, including 
the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) from 1955-1978, the Democrats (who 
held seats in the Australian Senate continuously from 1977-2004), One 
Nation (who rose in the late 1990s and then reappeared again in the 2016 
federal election), and the Greens (who first won seats as a national party 
in 1996 federal election and have seen a steady increase in their vote ever 
since).  
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In 2018, the Grattan Institute reported on this rise of minor parties in 
Australia, focussing on the period after 2004 (Wood and Daley 2018). 
They concluded that ‘the minor party vote is mostly a protest vote against 
the major parties: a vote for “anyone but them”’ (p. 3). The Institute argues 
that this is based primarily on falling trust in government, with minor party 
voters showing significantly more distrust in government than major party 
voters. One complication to this, however, is the establishment and rise of 
the Australian Greens.  
The growth of the Australian Greens 
The Greens were formed on the back of the conservation and other social 
movements of the 1970s and 1980s, federating into a national structure in 
1992 – although the West Australian Greens did not join until 2003 (Tietze 
2010). The Greens vote and membership surged around 2000, in the 
context of the Global Justice Movement, the invasions of Afghanistan and 
Iraq, and the Tampa Affair election in 2001 – where the issue of Australia’s 
hard-line position on refugees who arrive by boat was central (Tietze 2010; 
McAllister 2003). The party has grown from 2.92 percent of the national 
vote in 1996 to consistently being above 10 percent of the vote in elections 
since 2010, as demonstrated in Figure 8.  
While the rapid rise and decline of other minor parties is often directly 
associated with anti-political sentiments (Grattan Institute 2018), the 
narrative around the sustained rise of the Greens is less coherent. While a 
significant proportion of Greens votes – particularly in the party’s early 
years – were registered as a ‘protest vote’ against the ALP, the party has 
since established a cohort of stable voters. According to the Australian 
Election Study (2019), for example, nine percent of the voting population 
in 2019 aligned themselves as having Greens partisanship, a rise from only 
one percent in 1996. This has led some (e.g. Grattan Institute 2018) to 
argue the Greens now display more traits of a ‘major party’ than a ‘minor 
party’. While in the early stages the Greens’ success was based primarily 
on a protest vote, their recent stabilisation can also be seen to be due to a 
re-alignment on the left side of politics (Farrell 2020).  
Whether one is persuaded by the protest vote or re-alignment arguments, 
the rise of the Greens is relevant to anti-politics as it demonstrates 
volatility in the traditional two party system. The Greens have eroded the 
social base of the ALP, disrupting their ability to forge ongoing stable 
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governance and undermining the labourism at the heart of Australian 
political life for over a century.  
Figure 8: Australian Greens primary vote (% of all votes), House of 
Representatives, 1996-2019 
 
 Source: Australian Electoral Commission. 
 
We can therefore see a clear declining vote for both major parties over 
time, combined and separate. There is disruption on both the left and right 
– with minor parties such as Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, alongside 
conservative independents, disrupting the right side of politics, while the 
Greens remain the main dislocating force on the left. There is an evidently 
growing volatility in the Australian electoral system, with voters being 
more inclined to vote for minor parties. However, unlike in Europe, this 
volatility is having less impact on the stability of the two-party system due 
to the preferential system – which has reinforced the two-party system. 
This does not mean, however, that Australia’s major parties have remained 
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stable. Unable ‘to rely on a serious social base and facing an electorate that 
has stopped seeing the political system as representative of its interests’, 
increased volatility has seen ruptures within the internal operations of both 
parties, epitomised by the revolving door of Prime Ministers from 2010 to 
2018 (Tietze 2015). The political crisis arises because political classes no 
longer have authority from civil society to carry out reform. As Tietze 
argues, for most of the twentieth century political structures in Australia 
were buttressed by major parties with relatively stable social bases who 
had well-defined ideological differences. The present decomposition 
means parties are less tied to those they purport to represent and will ‘often 
pander to the ideological obsessions of their most fervent supporters, 
leading them to be even less relevant to mainstream voters’ (Tietze 2015). 
This has led to factional battles over party leadership positions on both 
sides of the aisle that bear little connection to what is happening in the 
electorate.  
The unreliable voter 
Australians have become less consistent with their long-term voting 
practices. Voters support parties that they have predispositions towards or 
with whom they share an affinity. Identification with a party, for the most 
part, is the best predictor of long-term support, with the stronger the 
support the more reliable the voter. Figure 9 reveals that the relationship 
between partisan strength and consistent voting has weakened since the 
late 1960s. A weak-partisan would always support one party over 65 
percent of the time in 1967; though this figure dropped to 30 percent by 
2019. The 35 percent decline in reliability for weak-partisans is only 
somewhat larger than the 25 percent and 15 percent declines for mid-
strength and strong-partisans. If partisanship is the glue of the party 
system, not only are there now less partisans, but their effectiveness in 
stabilising the party system has weakened. 
The decline in consistent voting is largely a product of reduced 
transmission of partisanship through parental socialisation. In other words, 
children are less likely to vote for the same party as their parents than was 
the case historically. This is the case both in Australia (McAllister 2011: 
49) and internationally (Aldrich et al. 2020).  
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Figure 9: Consistent voting (% of all voter) by partisan identity 
strength, 1967-2019 
 
Source: Australian National Political Attitudes Surveys (1967-79); Australian 
Electoral Study (1987-2019). 
 
Figure 10 pools five decades of survey data, which shows a predacious 
decline in consistent voting between each generation. This reflects the 
greater electoral options available to voters and perhaps greater political 
sophistication. There are clear implications for the stability of the party 
system, with younger voters increasingly more unreliable for major 
parties. 
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Figure 10: Consistent voting (% of all voter) by birth year, 1967-2019 
 
Source: Australian National Political Attitudes Surveys (1967-79); Australian 
Electoral Study (1987-2019). 
Party membership 
Declining membership of traditional political parties 
With no state-mandated requirement to disclose membership numbers, and 
most parties keen to keep this information private, data is erratic and 
limited – often only becoming available when ‘leaked’ by senior party 
activists. However, information in the MAAP project dataset shows that 
the two major parties have seen a significant decline in membership since 
they were founded. The data we present below is the absolute membership 
numbers, not as a proportion of the total population. Considering 
Australia’s growing population, the decline in membership is even more 
dramatic than it first appears.  
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Although the ALP was formed in 1901, there is only sporadic data 
available (see Figure 11). In 1954, the ALP had 75,000 members, after 
which membership declined over time. Membership was 67,000 in 1948 
(where the figures we use start) and has largely remained in the higher 
40,000s to lower 50,000s until now. Membership declined more sharply 
from 50,000 in 2002 to 26,000 in 2007, after which it recovered to just shy 
of 54,000 in 2014.  
Figure 11: Membership of ALP, Liberal Party, Country-National 
Party and Australian Greens, 1940-2019 
 
Source: (Australian Greens 2019; Van Haute et al. 2015; Jackson 2011). 
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The Liberal Party, formed in 1945, built its membership from an initial 
base of almost 100,000 to a high of 198,000 in 1950. Since then, and 
particularly after 1983, membership has declined to now sit at an historic 
low of 45,000 in 2013. The Liberal’s coalition partner, the National Party 
(and its predecessor the Country Party), has maintained a large 
membership of 80,000 or more between 1967 and 2013. Membership was 
at its highest in this period in 1988 when it reached 140,000, but declined 
to 100,000 in 2013. However, in combining the membership of the Liberal, 
Country and National Parties over time, there remains a significant overall 
decline.     
Cutting against this trend has been the establishment of the Australian 
Greens, whose membership has grown slowly since its early national 
electoral successes to sit at just above 13,696 in 2018/19 – after a high 
point of 15,523 in 2015/16. This growth in party membership must be seen 
in context, however, relative to the far-larger memberships of the legacy 
parties in the ALP, Liberals and Nationals/Country Party. Numerous 
parties on the Right have formed since the 1990s, but they have mostly 
been both relatively transient and not of significant size. The One Nation 
party had a fast-growing membership in the fourteen months after it was 
set up, although this later declined when Pauline Hanson left parliament. 
The party claimed to have over 25,000 members at its peak (Watson 2000: 
91). Thus, while there has not been a stable minor party on the right, there 
are clear signs of political instability and fracturing. 
As Figure 11 indicates, the decline in membership of the ALP and Liberal 
Parties predates the neoliberal era in Australia, and even the very early 
period of neoliberal policy making internationally in the mid-late 1970s. 
This is particularly pronounced in relation to the ALP, with its significant 
decline in membership occurring prior to 1970. 
Declining union membership 
Although Mair mentions the decline of unions and other civil society 
organisations, a focus on organised labour is important in locations where 
mass politics has been deeply shaped by labourism and where trade unions 
have rights and responsibilities (including voting rights) inside the 
electoral arm of the labour movement. The formation and growth of trade 
unions was an important facet in the integration of ‘the masses’ into 
political society and construction of political hegemony (Humphrys 2019). 
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Mass politics was organised through mass parties and, in turn, mass parties 
gained stability through socio-political institutions such as trade unions, 
churches and social clubs (Inglehart and Norris 2016: 11; Mair 2013: 78). 
The decline of civil society organisations, most particularly trade unions 
in Australia, has undermined the social weight of the section of the 
political class that was connected to those formations.  
Figure 12: Trade union membership density, 1911-2018 
 
Source: 1985-2010: Humphrys (2019); 1986-1993: ABS, Trade Union Members, 
cat. no. 6325.0; 1994-2013: ABS, Employee Earnings Benefits and Trade Union 
Membership, cat. no. 6310.0; 2014-2018: ABS, Characteristics of Employment, 
cat. no. 6333.0. 
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In Australia, union density steadily grew from Federation and reached 47 
percent in 1921. Density did not drop back below this figure until the late 
1980s. For much of the period, from 1921 to 1990, 50 percent of Australian 
workers were members of trade unions (Figure 12). From the mid 1980s, 
trade union density has continued to fall. Various changes contributed to 
the decline in union membership – particularly global and national 
economic structural adjustment, deindustrialisation, the end of ‘closed 
shops’, macroeconomic factors such as protracted higher unemployment, 
and the introduction of the ALP -ACTU Accord social contract (Humphrys 
2018b; Svensen and Griffin, 1996). The decline in union membership also 
occurred in a context of a mobilisation against organised labour by key 
elements of political society and the business sector, which included 
changes to legislation and civil action against workers’ organisations 
(Humphrys 2018b). 
In the context of anti-politics, the dramatic decline in union membership, 
alongside very low levels of industrial struggle, has undermined a key 
location of political activity and involvement in Australian society. More 
specifically, trade unions were once an important formation that facilitated 
the involvement of the working class in the functioning of politics. 
Whether trade union decline is a contributing cause of political 
detachment, a symptom of it, or both as part of a complex feedback 
process, is a question that requires further research. What is clear, however, 
is that the social base of the ALP in the trade unions has declined and been 
eroded – not only are there fewer union members, but the leadership of the 
unions and the ALP is far less connected to the membership of either than 
previously.  
Conclusion 
Anti-politics – both a generalised mood of political detachment and 
hostility, and the capturing of that mood by political candidates and 
movements – is a key political issue in many advanced capitalist countries. 
Underpinning anti-politics is a process whereby citizens are spurning 
previously established forms of participation in the electoral process and 
traditional political parties. These processes shape the ability of the 
political class to undertake political economic reform to meet urgent 
national and global challenges. 
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We have found that there is evidence for a decline in democratic 
engagement in Australia on the indicators set out by Mair, although the 
form it takes is particular to the context. A clear breakdown in the social 
basis of support for the two-party system that has dominated since 
Federation is occurring, with patterns of partisanship appreciably 
disrupted in the last three to four decades. It is also possible to determine 
increasing voter volatility, with voters more willing to vote for minor 
parties (although volatility has a different effect on Australian politics due 
to the nature of preferential voting). Partisanship levels in Australia are 
also seeing a steady decline, with voters both less inclined to identify with 
political parties, and identifying with them less strongly when they do. 
Membership of the ALP and Liberal Parties has been in significant decline 
since the mid-1950s, and there has been a dramatic decline in trade union 
density over the last forty years. 
Our analysis has revealed that processes of electoral and political party 
disengagement predate the neoliberal era, although on some indicators 
accelerated during that period. The decline in voter turnout and increase in 
informal voting both predate the neoliberal era. The fall in turnout has 
accelerated in the neoliberal period, but the rise in informal voting was 
similar prior to and during that era. The weakening of political partisanship 
and increase in voter volatility changes have both accelerated in the 
neoliberal period. In the case of party membership, the decline of the ALP 
and Liberal Parties well precedes the neoliberal era. The decline in union 
density pre-dates the neoliberal era, but an acceleration of the decline 
coincides with it. 
We conclude that there is clear evidence to support the claim that a process 
of popular withdrawal and disengagement from conventional politics is 
occurring in Australia, similar to that occurring in the long-term 
democracies in Europe. As with Mair’s findings, the small shifts detailed 
on individual criteria take on a different meaning when considered 
alongside longer-term trends and multiple criteria. Moreover, and similar 
to the analysis set out in Ruling the Void, although the pattern in Australia 
is not wholly unidirectional, the overall direction and reach of the 
phenomenon is unmistakable. This is of crucial importance in assessing 
smaller movements on some of the measures above, which would take on 
less significance if they were isolated occurrences. 
How popular withdrawal and disengagement from traditional politics is 
related to anti-politics will hopefully be the subject of further research in 
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Australia. The import of this for political economy is understanding that 
policy reform of the scope and nature required to address significant 
national and global challenges – including the existential threat of climate 
change – cannot be implemented by a fractured political class. Moreover, 
whether the structures of representative politics common to the highly 
industrialised countries can (or even should) be repaired, or whether new 
forms of democratic decision-making and participation will emerge, must 
be at the heart of these discussions. 
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